Beyond counting climate consensus by Pearce, Warren et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/17524032.2017.1333965
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Pearce, W., Grundmann, R., Hulme, M., Raman, S., Kershaw, E. H., & Tsouvalis, J. (2017). Beyond counting
climate consensus. Environmental communication-A journal of nature and culture, 1-8.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2017.1333965
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
Beyond counting climate consensus 1 
Reiner Grundmann, University of Nottingham, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University 2 
Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD.  Reiner.Grundmann@nottingham.ac.uk  3 
Warren Pearce, University of Sheffield, The Department of Sociological Studies, Faculty of Social 4 
Science. Warren.Pearce@Sheffield.ac.uk  5 
Mike Hulme, Kings College, Department of Geography, London 6 
WC2R 2LS. Mike.hulme@kcl.ac.uk  7 
Sujatha Raman, University of Nottingham, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University Park, 8 
Nottingham NG7 2RD. Sujatha.Raman@nottingham.ac.uk  9 
Eleanor Hadley Kershaw, University of Nottingham, University of Nottingham, School of 10 
Sociology and Social Policy, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD. 11 
Eleanor.hadleykershaw@nottingham.ac.uk  12 
Judith Tsouvalis, University of Nottingham, School of Sociology and Social Policy, University 13 
Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD. Judith.Tsouvalis@nottingham.ac.uk  14 
 15 
 16 
ABSTRACT: 17 
Several studies have been using quantified consensus within climate science as an argument to 18 
foster climate policy. Recent efforts to communicate such scientific consensus attained a high 19 
public profile but it is doubtful if they can be regarded successful. We argue that repeated efforts to 20 
shore up the scientific consensus on minimalist claims such as ‘humans cause global warming’ are 21 
distractions from more urgent matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public 22 
engagement.  Such efforts to force policy progress through communicating scientific consensus 23 
misunderstand the relationship between scientific knowledge, publics and policymakers. More 24 
important is to focus on genuinely controversial issues within climate policy debates where 25 
expertise might play a facilitating role. Mobilising expertise in policy debates calls for judgment, 26 
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 2 
context and attention to diversity, rather than deferring to formal quantifications of narrowly 1 
scientific claims.  2 
 3 
INTRODUCTION 4 
Quantification of consensus within climate science continues to occupy a central role in public 5 
discussions of climate change, with a particular focus on the level of agreement regarding the 6 
anthropogenic contribution to global temperature rise. Since 2004, a series of papers have addressed 7 
this issue (Oreskes, 2004; Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Verheggen et al., 2014). One of 8 
these (Cook et al., 2013) (C13) has gained particular prominence with the claim that 97.1% of those 9 
papers expressing a position on anthropogenic global warming either explicitly states or implies that 10 
humans cause warming. The claim has had significant media impact (Skeptical Science, 2014), 11 
inspired a popular television comedy programme (Kelly, 2014), been adjudged Environmental 12 
Research Letters’ best article for 2013 (Kammen, 2013), and even been tweeted by President 13 
Obama (Obama, 2013) (albeit embellishing C13’s original claim with the word ‘dangerous’). 14 
Consensus quantification is justified by arguing that public ignorance of consensus amongst climate 15 
scientists provides a barrier to the implementation of climate change mitigation policy (Oreskes, 16 
2004; Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Verheggen et al., 2014). Here, we argue that 17 
focusing on consensus amongst experts as a route to policy progress misunderstands the role of 18 
scientific knowledge in public affairs and policymaking. Drawing on examples from the extensive 19 
science and technology studies (STS) literature, we show that building the basis for policy action 20 
cannot be done simply with appeals to fact. Where these facts are complex and negotiated, as in the 21 
case of climate change, experts and policymakers need to acknowledge and engage more actively 22 
with public ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004). 23 
SCIENCE 24 
 3 
Nowhere is the social negotiation of fact clearer than in the case of C13 itself. The publication of 1 
the article prompted a long-running and robust debate on blogs (e.g. …and Then There’s Physics, 2 
2014; Pile, 2013; Nuccitelli, 2013; Hulme, 2014), within the pages of scientific journals (Tol, 2014; 3 
2016; Cook et al., 2014; Cook & Cowtan, 2015; Duarte, 2014) and even in the US Congress 4 
(Vaidyanathan, 2014).  One focus of discussion has been the high proportion of abstracts in C13 5 
without a position, when compared with the previous consensus study conducted by Oreskes 6 
(2004). Both studies rate abstracts, ‘but where Oreskes finds 75% agreement and 25% no position, 7 
Cook has 33% agreement, 66% no position and 1% disagreement.’ (Tol, 2016). In fact, C13 re-8 
analysed the sample used by Oreskes based on their methodology. They found a wide discrepancy: 9 
‘Of the ... 894 [papers], none rejected the consensus, consistent with Oreskes’ result. Oreskes 10 
determined that 75% of papers endorsed the consensus, based on the assumption that mitigation and 11 
impact papers implicitly endorse the consensus. By comparison, we found that 28% of the 894 12 
abstracts endorsed AGW while 72% expressed no position.’ (Cook et al., 2013). 13 
 14 
We do not wish to adjudicate on this disagreement here. Rather, these arguments demonstrate the 15 
pitfalls of attempting to quantify consensus in the scientific literature in the manner of C13 in order 16 
to produce ‘proof’ for persuading the public. Rather than securing certainty that was absent before, 17 
this exercise has invited intense scrutiny to the judgments underpinning their claim, and generated 18 
further doubt. This was a predictable outcome on the basis of STS studies which show that doing 19 
more research on politically controversial, high-stakes policy matters typically increases uncertainty 20 
(Collingridge & Reeve, 1986). This happens as different parties are motivated to undercut each 21 
other’s claims, and the complexity of scientific judgment lends itself to generating endless 22 
disagreement on technical grounds (Sarewitz, 2004). Contributing to public debate and policy 23 
therefore calls for a more cosmopolitan approach to climate knowledge where the limits of 24 
 4 
scientific resolution to intractable disputes are acknowledged and efforts made to communicate and 1 
engage with the implications of different positions, not all derived from science (Beck, 2012). This 2 
brings us to the rationale for consensus quantification, not only as a means of communication 3 
within the scientific community, but also as a means of public communication and persuasion.   4 
 5 
PUBLICS 6 
The argument for quantifying the scientific consensus on climate change is often made in terms of 7 
better informing a misinformed public. For example, proponents use opinion poll evidence to argue 8 
that there is a "significant gap between public perceptions and reality, with 57% of the US public 9 
either disagreeing or unaware that scientists overwhelmingly agree that the earth is warming due to 10 
human activity" (Cook et al., 2013, p. 6), and that this misperception is a result of misinformation 11 
spread by opponents of climate policies (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Since the public seems 12 
unaware that such a science consensus exists, consensus communicators seek to publicize its 13 
existence.  Following experimental evidence from psychology, this gap is believed to be associated 14 
with reduced support for a range of climate policies (Ding et al., 2011) and that this gap can be 15 
closed by providing effective information regarding the extent of consensus within climate science 16 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013). However, these experimental findings have been challenged in two 17 
ways in the literature. First, if increasing (consensual) scientific knowledge merely accentuates the 18 
cultural “conflict of interest” within some individuals (Kahan et al., 2012), then climate science 19 
knowledge need not be the only basis upon which climate-friendly policies can be advocated. 20 
Second, if one treats the history of research and public communication of climate consensus as a 21 
natural experiment, then the persistence of the ‘consensus gap’ suggests consensus messaging has 22 
limited efficacy (Kahan, 2015). A more recent study acknowledges the influence of political 23 
ideology and cultural values in shaping attitudes about climate, but still argues that ‘the positive 24 
 5 
effect of climate information (or conversely, the negative effect of misinformation) still plays a 1 
significant role in influencing climate literacy levels’ (Cook, 2016, p. 5).  2 
Here, consensus messaging is argued to be important because even people with left-liberal views do 3 
not know the correct level of scientific consensus.  It is also argued that it is important to refute 4 
misinformation, since this is the mechanism through which beneficial framings and correct 5 
information about climate are being ‘neutralized’ (2016, p. 13). The scholarly debate about 6 
consensus messaging is intense but based on a relatively small pool of researchers and published 7 
papers. Debates within psychology, and broader debates about the usefulness of laboratory studies 8 
in assessing efficacy present a picture of an emerging field of study that has yet to reach a 9 
‘consensus on consensus’. 10 
 11 
Even if one were to identify the precise effect of consensus messaging as a variable in climate 12 
communication, the fact remains that in many fields of climate change research scientific consensus 13 
is elusive. Scientific consensus exists among some relevant, small communities (for example, 14 
attribution studies leading to affirm AGW), but there are many fields relevant to climate change 15 
impacts where such a consensus does not hold. For example, the IPCC reported in its Fifth 16 
Assessment Report that “[n]o best estimate for equilibrium climate sensitivity can now be given 17 
because of a lack of agreement on values across assessed lines of evidence and studies” (IPCC, 18 
2013, p. 16). Regarding increases in North Atlantic tropical cyclone activity “[t]here remains 19 
substantial disagreement on the relative importance of internal variability, GHG forcing and 20 
aerosols for this observed trend” (IPCC, 2013, p. 914). Since the release of the Fifth Assessment 21 
Report, diverse views have been published in the academic literature regarding the existence or 22 
otherwise of a slowdown in global surface warming (Karl et al., 2015; Fyfe et al., 2016).  23 
 24 
 6 
Acknowledging scientific dissensus in these matters is not the same as rejecting climate change as a 1 
global policy problem. What this does demonstrate, however, is that in the complex, multifaceted 2 
realm of climate science, relying on scientific consensus to cauterise public debate is a self-3 
defeating strategy. Climate science is complex and findings often contradictory and, most 4 
importantly, does not tell us anything about what to do about climate change. Consensus-seeking is 5 
neither a social requisite nor a normative ideal for a viable democracy (Rescher, 1993); 6 
acknowledging and valuing dissensus would allow a more publicly inclusive and accessible debate 7 
over approaches to climate change that do not prematurely foreclose particular policy options 8 
(Machin, 2013). Attempts to remove political conflict from climate change have proved to be a 9 
dead end, part of a troubling wider trend towards depoliticising key policy issues (Hay, 2007) and 10 
which is now being called into question in an ongoing ‘populist’ backlash.    11 
 Attempts to remove political conflict from climate change have proved to be a dead end, part of a 12 
troubling wider trend towards depoliticising key policy issues.   Depending on which facet of 13 
climate change one picks, the statement ‘there is no consensus’ is more likely to hold than not. 14 
[This will be a controversial statement, so specific examples backed up with citations is needed 15 
here. I would recommend deleting the statement. The meaning of the paragraph would still hold, 16 
avoiding unnecessarily distracting the reader from your core arguments. In short, I don’t think you 17 
gain much from the statement, and stand more to lose persuasively] TThe science is complex and 18 
often contradictory and, most importantly, does not tell us anything about what to do about climate 19 
change.  20 
 21 
The focus on quantifying scientific consensus as a way of trying to settle controversy or persuade 22 
the public to support specific policies reveals an unquestioned faith in a particular repertoire for 23 
producing, validating and using knowledge, what scholars in science and technology studies call 24 
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 7 
‘civic epistemology’ (Jasanoff, 2011; Miller, 2005). Consensus quantification is just one way of 1 
trying to resolve epistemic conflicts into useful evidence. Traditionally favoured in US 2 
environmental risk assessment, this approach has sometimes had the opposite effect of exacerbating 3 
controversy. For example, the attempt to identify and regulate potential carcinogens such as 4 
formaldehyde has foundered in an American regulatory system that demands quantified evidence of 5 
hazard and encourages adversarial scrutiny and endless deconstruction of competing evidentiary 6 
claims (Jasanoff, 1986).  7 
 8 
Quantification may well work in specific times and cultures as a way of making the unseen visible 9 
or of holding governments to account, or indeed, as a symbol around which a particular community 10 
coalesces. In this way, the ‘97% consensus’ may be a number around which those already 11 
committed to climate change action who are inclined to trust climate scientists can rally (Corner & 12 
Roberts, 2014), rather than one which can be persuasive for other groups in political discussion 13 
(Kahan et al., 2011). Groups who are not persuaded by appeals to scientific authority as a 14 
justification for policy might (rationally) seek to question whether such science is ‘sound’ 15 
(Demeritt, 2001), placing climate science under stresses it is ill-equipped to bear (Pearce et al., 16 
2015). Fundamentally, no set of calculations about epistemic consensus can help to tie people 17 
together in the absence of other social connections (Miller, 2005). For example, research in political 18 
psychology emphasises the importance of morality and values in binding together societal groups 19 
(Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 2002) and in religious studies the role of cosmology and cultural identity 20 
(Wilson & Steger, 2013)  21 
 22 
POLICYMAKERS 23 
 8 
Even if one puts to one side the non-scientific characteristics of public communication, it is unwise 1 
to assume that closing the consensus gap will influence public policy. We present two reasons here. 2 
First, the literature on science and policy shows that the level of scientific agreement about an issue 3 
often has little influence on policy action. For example, before the Montreal negotiations to regulate 4 
chlorofluorocarbons, expectations for an ambitious treaty were low despite claims of a science 5 
consensus about long-term ozone depletion (Grundmann, 2001). However, the picture changed just 6 
prior to the negotiations with the discovery of the Antarctic ‘ozone hole’, a dramatic crisis signal 7 
that was in itself completely unexpected. Thus, the subsequent political agreement of the Montreal 8 
Protocol to regulate chlorofluorocarbons was more the result of the unexplained phenomenon of the 9 
‘ozone hole’ prompting ozone depletion to be a matter of concern than any coalescing of scientific 10 
consensus. Influential narratives about the genesis of the Montreal Protocol maintain that not only 11 
was the process science driven, but that there was a scientific consensus that led to the political 12 
agreement (see Haas, 1992; Tolba, 2008). In fact, the process was driven by changing political 13 
constellations, mainly a U-turn of big chemical companies and the European Community, 14 
accompanied by the hot crisis signal of the ‘ozone hole’ (for details, see Benedick, 1998; 15 
Grundmann, 2001). If anything moved policy towards the agreement in Montreal it was the 16 
discovery of the ozone hole, not the agreement among atmospheric scientists about future ozone 17 
losses. 18 
 19 
Second, an undue focus on scientific consensus brings about missteps in policy. By narrowing the 20 
terms of political debate about the desirability of this or that (or indeed any) climate policy to the 21 
physical sciences, scientific facts are used to substitute for matters of public concern. Legitimate 22 
and necessary public argument about whether a fact matters, and why, is short-circuited. Debates 23 
about the value of carbon emissions reductions are divorced from their social and political contexts 24 
 9 
(Cohen et al., 1998). For example, Pearce (2014) demonstrates how scientific consensus constitutes 1 
poor evidence for policy in the absence of compelling ideas and arguments, while Twyman et al. 2 
(2015) contrast the universal meaning of carbon as a scientific element with its complex local 3 
meanings within communities of the global South. In short, scientific consensus does not 4 
necessarily beget policy progress. Equally, policy progress is not necessarily dependent on 5 
acceptance of scientific consensus. The US nominee for Secretary of Energy, Governor Rick Perry, 6 
does not accept the consensus enumerated in the literature, yet still made Texas into “the nation’s 7 
leading generator of wind power, a renewable technology that he promoted heavily during his 14 8 
years in office” (Mervis, 2016). Also in the U.S., the Green Tea Party, a coalition of grassroots 9 
conservatives who have allied with environmentalists, predicates support for decentralised, solar 10 
energy primarily as an expression of libertarian values rather than as a means of reducing carbon 11 
emissions, enabling it to sidestep the cultural polarisation that exists around belief in human-caused 12 
climate change (Kormann, 2015). Research in the UK also emphasises the potential for concepts of 13 
patriotism and conservation as a means of building coalitions of support for climate policy with 14 
conservatives in the UK (Whitmarsh and Corner, 2017). 15 
 16 
While these examples demonstrate that the relationship between science and policy is not linear, we 17 
emphasise that scientific advice to policymakers remains a crucial element of democracy 18 
(Gluckman & Wilsdon, 2016). However, important and controversial issues within climate change, 19 
such as the effect of GHGs and aerosols on monsoonal weather systems and the the likelihood of 20 
ice-shelf collapse may not easily lend themselves to quantifiable claims of scientific consensus. 21 
Merely emphasising the strength of a narrowly drawn epistemic consensus underestimates the 22 
challenges of many of these issues. Expertise can play a role in policy deliberation and public 23 
endorsement, but it requires attention to judgment, context and diversity. What makes knowledge 24 
 10 
useful for policy is the ability to identify levers for action and an appreciation of how scientific 1 
advice will be interpreted and used in policy processes (Grundmann & Stehr, 2012; Geden, 2016). 2 
Engaging with this question of action inevitably means acknowledging different values and 3 
pathways forward. This opens up questions about the social dimensions of successful policy-4 
making, beyond fantasies of technocratic solutions.  5 
 6 
For political action on climate change, the messier work of engaging diverse publics across 7 
different scales and with different interests and affiliations is urgently needed (Jasanoff, 2010), 8 
particularly as there is strong evidence that linking climate to local issues is an important factor in 9 
successful policy implementation (Ryan, 2015). Climate change is conventionally framed as a 10 
global problem, causing tension with local policy implementation (Pearce, 2014). Thus, 11 
policymakers must often focus on other drivers in order to make successful arguments for policy; 12 
for example, improving local air quality or public transport (Ryan, 2015). In the absence of such 13 
connections, efforts to quantify scientific consensus about an abstract global process come across as 14 
strategies to close down political debate rather than ‘moving it on’. Defining the central problem in 15 
terms of reducing carbon emissions has allowed technical fixes such as geo-engineering and low-16 
carbon energy to take centre-stage at the expense of a host of wider visions for social, economic and 17 
political change. We do not want to endorse any one of these, but merely wish to call attention to 18 
the many such visions of transformative innovation being put forward (Leach et al., 2012), and that 19 
debating these does not need to wait until a narrow scientifically-defined consensus has been 20 
achieved.  21 
 22 
BEYOND COUNTING CONSENSUS 23 
 11 
We have highlighted the limited public and policy value of enumerating consensus within climate 1 
science. A fundamental point is that, while knowledge and concerns about anthropogenic climate 2 
change have emerged mainly from scientific enquiry, responding to climate change is a deeply 3 
political process. Social media provides one means of studying the political life of climate change.  4 
This distinction was exemplified For example, the publication of the 2014 following the release of 5 
the most recent IPCC report on the physical science basis of climate change, as social media 6 
prompted saw an explosion of new meanings exchanges on social media that which went well 7 
beyond the contents of the report itselfextended into political aspects of climate change such as ; for 8 
example, the role of the media’s role in publicising climate change in the public sphere, the national 9 
party politics of climate change within certain nation states, carbon taxes and activism around  10 
fracking (Pearce et al., 2014).  This plurality of meaningsThis attachment of new public meanings 11 
to a scientific report  opens a window into the politics of dissensus, rather than of consensus, which 12 
is critical to understand and engage with if widespread support for policy measures is to be gained. 13 
Climate change is a political challenge where establishing facts such as ‘humans cause climate 14 
change’ is largely irrelevant to the more important task of establishing which facts matter, to whom 15 
and why (Jasanoff, 2010). 16 
 17 
One implication for research arising from our argument is to better understand the forms and 18 
conditions of knowledge which ‘open-up’ spaces for constructive policy innovation and 19 
deliberation (Stirling, 2010). Centering on consensus about climate science in public debates does 20 
little to resolve the most pressing questions in climate policy design and implementation.  Instead, it 21 
distracts attention away from important practical challenges that highlight the need to negotiate 22 
between different scales of concern and action rather than box them into a linear relationship 23 
between scientific consensus and political action. These challenges include the need to: i) attend to, 24 
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 12 
and work with, different local meanings of climate and climate change (Hulme, 2017) and their 1 
relationship to human institutions and behaviour (Jasanoff, 2010); ii) negotiate between concerns 2 
about the planet as a whole and local expressions of development rights and responsibilities 3 
(Jasanoff & Martello, 2004); and iii) find more inclusive ways of fostering innovation in cleaner 4 
energy technologies and selecting appropriate levels of investment in climate adaptation. These 5 
challenges may also represent opportunities to connect apparently disparate issues, human values 6 
and policy objectives in productive ways. But this requires developing skills in expert judgment 7 
across multiple spaces of science, political and public discussion (Hoppe, 2011; Raman, 2014) 8 
rather than a focus on scientific consensus. At some point, political questions will necessarily be 9 
closed down, at least temporarily, when policy decisions are taken. We argue that the legitimacy of 10 
such a closing down is achieved through a process of engaging with dissent on alternative policy 11 
pathways, and indeed, actively creating the conditions for a more diverse range of possibilities to be 12 
explored where these are not already apparent.  13 
 14 
CONCLUSION 15 
In terms of publicity, recent efforts to communicate the scientific consensus may be judged a 16 
success. Such efforts imply the primacy of scientific knowledge in the formation of public beliefs 17 
about matters of concern and in the successful implementation of policy. In this 18 
commentarycommentary, we have argued that rthe opposite. Repeated efforts to shore up the 19 
scientific consensus on minimalist claims such as ‘humans cause global warming’ are distractions 20 
from these more urgent matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public engagement.  We 21 
maintain that researchers concerned about the relationship of knowledge to policy would be better 22 
advised to invest their efforts in these areas rather than in exercises of quantifying consensus about 23 
tightly drawn statements of scientific fact. This lesson goes beyond climate change and should be 24 
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 13 
acknowledged by those hoping that communicating scientific consensus can defuse other 1 
environmental controversies, such as around genetically modified organisms (e.g., Lynas, 2016). In 2 
short, we need the skills for developing and deploying expert judgment in practical contexts, rather 3 
than quantitative techniques for capturing consensus in climate science and then using such metrics 4 
as a rhetorical driver of climate policy.  5 
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